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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a new methodological framework for measuring the level of
household access to credit. It provides an analytical framework for examining the
determinants of household credit limits and derives implications on information needed to
examine the extent to which households are credit constrained. Empirical application of
this method involves directly eliciting credit limit information in household surveys.
Illustrations are provided using data from Bangladesh and Malawi. v
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Most policy and research interests regarding rural credit markets revolve around the
perception that poor rural households in developing countries lack adequate access to
credit, which is believed to have significant negative consequences on various aggregate
and household-level outcomes, including technology adoption, agricultural productivity,
food security, nutrition, health, and overall household welfare.
Access to credit affects household welfare outcomes through at least two channels.
First, it alleviates the capital constraints on agricultural households. Expenditures on
agricultural inputs must be incurred during the planting and growth periods of crops, while
returns are received only after the harvest several months later. Therefore, to finance the
purchase of inputs, the farm household must either dip into savings or obtain credit.
Hence, access to credit can significantly increase the ability of poor household with no or
little savings to acquire needed agricultural inputs. Access to credit also reduces the
opportunity costs of capital-intensive assets relative to family labor, thus encouraging
labor-saving technologies and raising labor productivity, a crucial factor for development,
especially in many African countries (Delgado 1995; Zeller et al. 1997).
The second channel through which access to credit affects household welfare is by
increasing its risk-bearing ability and altering its risk-coping strategy. Just the knowledge
that credit will be available to cushion consumption against an income shortfall should a
potentially profitable, but risky, investment turn out badly will induce the household to2
bear the additional risk. The household may therefore be willing to adopt new, more risky
technologies (Eswaran and Kotwal 1990). A household may also benefit from mere access
to credit, even if it is not borrowing, because with the option of borrowing it can avoid
adopting risk-reducing, but inefficient, income diversification strategies or engaging in
precautionary savings with negative returns.
For these reasons, most developing countries’ governments and donors during the
past 40 years have set up credit programs aimed at improving rural households’ access to
credit. The vast majority of these programs, especially the so-called “agricultural
development banks” that provide credit at subsidized interest rates, have failed both to
achieve their objectives to serve the rural poor and be sustainable credit institutions
(Adams, Graham, and von Pischke 1984; Braverman and Guasch 1986; Adams and Vogel
1985). Meanwhile, most rural households in developing countries continue to rely on the
informal credit market for their intertemporal transfer of resources. They use complex
strategies to increase their productive capacity, share risk, and smooth consumption over
their life cycles. These strategies generally work through self-enforcing informal contracts
among friends, neighbors, and members of the extended family, and are arranged within
networks of informal institutions of diverse natures (Fafchamps 1992; Coate and Ravallion
1993; Lund and Fafchamps 1997). One hypothesis, often advanced by researchers and
policymakers, is that government and NGO-supported credit programs may crowd out the
financial services offered by these informal financial institutions. Hence, understanding
how the nonmarket informal institutions serve households’ demand for financial services3
and interact with the formal credit institutions set up by governments and NGOs is critical
in identifying policies, institutional designs, and financial services that expand and
complement rather than substitute for the services offered by the existing informal credit
market. An important step for obtaining this policy-relevant information is to quantify the
extent and determinants of households’ access to nonformal and formal credit markets as
well as the severity of their credit constraints.
The objectives of this paper are twofold: to present a new methodological
framework for measuring the level and determinants of household access to credit and
credit constraints, and the effects of access to credit on household behavior and welfare;
and to exemplify the methodology with data collected in Malawi and Bangladesh on the
extent of rural households’ access to credit and credit constraints in developing countries.
Since the novelty of the methodology is mainly the nature of the data collected, the
method of presenting the empirical evidence is almost exclusively tabular and descriptive.
The credit limit is the key variable in the methodology and, to the authors’ knowledge,
data on it have never been collected before. Therefore, the paper discusses data collection
issues regarding this variable. An econometric analysis that formalizes the methodology of
this paper is presented in Diagne (1997, 1999).
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews briefly the methodologies that
have been used in the literature to measure household access to credit and credit
constraints. Section 3 presents the new methodology for measuring access to credit and its
effects on household welfare outcomes and discusses the various credit-related concepts4
underlying the methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence on the extent of
household access to credit and credit constraints in Malawi and Bangladesh. Section 5
concludes the paper with remarks on the policy relevance of the methodology and
empirical evidence.
2. REVIEW OF EXISTING APPROACHES OF MEASURING ACCESS
TO CREDIT AND CREDIT CONSTRAINTS
Broadly speaking, there are two methodologies for measuring household access to
credit and credit constraints. The first and indirect method infers the presence of credit
constraints from violations of the assumptions of the life-cycle or permanent income
hypothesis, while the second collects information directly from household surveys on
whether households perceive themselves to be credit constrained.
DETECTION OF CREDIT CONSTRAINT THROUGH VIOLATION OF LIFE-CYCLE
HYPOTHESIS
One of the testable implications of the simple version of the life-cycle/permanent
income hypothesis (LC/PIH) is that in the absence of liquidity and borrowing constraints,
transitory income shocks should not affect consumption (see, for example, Hall 1978, and
Deaton 1992). Empirical models testing for the presence of credit constraints based on the
life-cycle/permanent income or “consumption-smoothing” hypotheses use household
consumption and income data to look for a significant dependence (or “excess sensitivity”)5
of consumption on transitory income. Empirical evidence of a significant dependence is
taken as an indication of a borrowing or liquidity constraint. The LC/PIH literature is
extensive and is reviewed by Browning and Lusardi (1996), Besley (1995), Deaton (1992;
1989), Alderman and Paxson (1992), and Gersovitz (1988), among others. In general, the
empirical evidence based on the LC/PIH approach has been inconclusive. At first, one may
think that this is due to the fact that empirical testing of the implications of the LC/PIH
requires repeated observations on the same household, whereas most of the studies are
based on relatively short panels. However, there are more fundamental reasons why the
evidence from the LC/PIH approach for detecting credit constraint has been inconclusive.
First, and perhaps most important, under conditions of uncertainty, violation of the
implications of the LC/PIH can result from prudent or precautionary behavior even if the
household is not credit constrained (Zeldes 1989b; Kimball 1990; Carroll 1991). Several
authors have extended the standard life-cycle model to explicitly incorporate both liquidity
constraint and precautionary behavior, and assess either through simulation or empirical
testing the importance of each effect (Zeldes 1989b; Morduch 1990; Deaton 1991; Paxson
1992). However, due to identification problems, it is nearly impossible to disentangle the
effects of credit constraint and precautionary behavior from the type of income,
consumption, and asset data typically available for these studies (Browning and Lusardi
1996). Second, if conditions of uncertainty are negatively correlated with wealth, then
current income will be negatively correlated with consumption growth, even in the
absence of borrowing constraints (Carroll 1991). Moreover, as Deaton (1990) points out,6
the effect of negative income shocks on consumption also depends on the initial asset
position of households. Browning and Lusardi (1996, 1832) list several other reasons why
the implications of the LC/PIH may be violated even without a credit constraint.
Furthermore, an important insight from the simulation results of Deaton (1991) is that a
credit-constrained household may still be able to smooth consumption with precautionary
saving and thus not violate any implication of the LC/PIH. Hence, one can conclude that
the violation of an implication of the LC/PIH is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition
for being credit constrained. 
DETECTION OF CREDIT CONSTRAINT BY DIRECTLY ASKING HOUSEHOLDS
The second method of detecting the presence of credit constraint uses information
gained directly from household members on their participation and experiences in the
credit market to determine if they are credit constrained. In practice, households are
classified as credit constrained, based on their responses to several qualitative questions
regarding their loan applications (or lack of) and rejections during a given recall period.
This classification is then used in reduced-form regression equations to analyze the
determinants of the likelihood of a household being credit constrained and the effects of
this likelihood on various household outcomes. The method was first applied by Jappelli
(1990) using data from the U.S. 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances and by Feder et al.
(1990) using data from a household survey in China. The method was subsequently used
by Zeller (1994), Schrieder and Heidhues (1995), and Zeller, Sumiter, and Sharma (1996)7
with household survey data from Madagascar, Cameroon, and Pakistan; and by Barham
and Boucher (1994) with data from Guatemala. The theoretical justification for the direct
method itself can be found in the extended version of the life-cycle/permanent income
model that explicitly allows for the possibility of a credit constraint. For example, Jappelli
(1990) used the credit constraint inequality in the extended model to derive reduced-form
equations for the determinants of the likelihood of a household being constrained. The
information on household credit-market experiences collected in the direct method is also
an important contribution toward empirically identifying the respective effects of liquidity
constraint and precautionary behavior in life-cycle models (Browning and Lusardi 1996). 
However, despite representing a substantial improvement compared to trying to
detect presence of credit constraint through violation of the LC/PIH, the direct method, as
it has been applied so far, is still incapable of providing a framework that allows the
quantification of the extent to which households are credit constrained or a satisfactory
assessment of the impact of access to credit on household welfare outcomes. Indeed, the
approach is still qualitative in the sense that households are classified as either credit
constrained or not with no information on how severely credit constrained they are.
Similarly, the estimation of the determinants of credit constraint provides only information
on what socioeconomic factors affect the likelihood of a household being credit
constrained. It does not provide the answer to the question of how these socioeconomic
factors affect the extent to which a household is credit constrained. The approach also
does not allow an assessment of the effects of loosening, but not completely relaxing, the8
credit constraint has on household welfare outcomes. This would valuable information for
policymakers, who are often faced with the need to allocate limited resources to several
competing projects, all of which aim to increase the poor’s welfare. To correct the
shortcomings of the direct method, the next section develops a conceptual framework and
data collection methodology that aims to measure the extent to which households are
credit constrained. 
3. EXTENSION OF THE DIRECT METHOD: THE CREDIT LIMIT VARIABLE
The credit market can be—and often is—analyzed as any other commodity market
would be, using the concept of demand and supply of credit, with the interest rate being
the price of credit. In this framework, the supply and demand curve represents,
respectively, the amount the lender is willing to lend and the amount the borrower is
willing to borrow at exogenously given interest rates. This simplistic Walrasian equilibrium
view of the credit market is, however, not useful for understanding the nature of credit
transactions and their outcomes (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Freixas and Rochet 1997). For
one, the assumption of price-taking behavior on the part of the lender is hardly realistic,
especially in a developing country context. For example, village moneylenders are often
known to behave monopolistically toward borrowers, determining interest rates based on
the characteristics of the borrower and on the size of the loans. In the vast majority of
cases of mutual lending between friends and relatives (which dominates the informal credit9
 Thus, it is extremely rare to find two credit programs charging the same interest rate even if they
1
operate in the same geographical areas.
market of Sub-Saharan Africa), lenders choose not to charge interest. Even in the
semiformal credit market dominated by NGOs and government-supported credit programs
targeted at particular sections of the population, lenders set various interest rates
according to criteria related to accessibility, equity, poverty alleviation, or the desire to
increase agricultural output.
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Even without the unrealistic price-taking behavior assumption, more fundamental
problems related to information asymmetries and contract enforcement make the simplistic
Walrasian equilibrium view of the credit market inappropriate for understanding the nature
of credit transactions and their outcomes. These problems are discussed in the next
section.
THE CONCEPT OF CREDIT LIMIT
The inappropriateness of the Walrasian equilibrium view of the credit market can be
seen when the analysis focuses at the level of an individual credit transaction. It is noted at
the outset that credit from any possible source is of limited supply, i.e., lenders are
constrained by factors beyond their control on the maximum amount they can possibly
lend to any potential borrower. This maximum is a function of available resources and is
independent of the interest rate that can be charged and of the likelihood of default. This is
especially true in developing countries, where even established commercial banks are very10
limited in their ability to raise capital for on-lending. Consequently, any borrower,
however creditworthy, faces a limit on the overall amount he can borrow from any given
source of credit; regardless of the interest rate he is willing to pay, or collateral he is
willing to put up.
Furthermore, due to the possibility of default and lack of effective contract
enforcement mechanisms, lenders have additional incentives to restrict the supply of
credit, even if they have more than enough to meet a given demand and the borrower is
willing to pay a high enough interest rate (Avery 1981; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). As
shown by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the possibility of adverse selection arising from the
asymmetry of information between the lender and the borrower will usually prevent the
lender from using the interest rate as a way to ration credit (i.e., to eliminate excess
demand for credit).
From the borrower’s view, the relevant limit on supply is not the maximum the
lender is able to lend, but rather the maximum the lender is willing to lend. The wedge
between the willing and able represents the extent of the credit rationing that arises mainly
because of information asymmetries. However, whether there is credit rationing or not,
there is a perceived maximum limit that cannot be exceeded when borrowing, regardless
of the interest rate one is willing to pay. This credit limit is the focus of the methodology
for quantifying the extent of household access to credit presented here. 
Before elaborating further on the credit limit, it should be pointed out that there is
nothing new in the concept, as it explicitly or implicitly underlies any discussion of creditct & yt & At
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or liquidity constraints in the LC\PIH literature. However, the formulation of the credit
constraint in the LC\PIH literature focuses on household assets, income, and consumption
variables, and abstracts from all the variables related directly to the credit market. The
former set of variables do affect credit transactions, but only indirectly (except the case of
an asset being used as collateral). The most important credit variable, the actual amount
borrowed, is almost never explicit in a formulation of the credit constraint in the LC\PIH
literature. It is reduced to being simply the residual  , where c, y, and A are t   t     t
household consumption, labor income, and net asset holding, respectively. The credit limit
variable is almost always implicit in the LC/PIH framework. Even in Jappelli’s formulation
where the credit limit variable is explicit, it ends up being eliminated through a reduced-
form specification of its determinants. Consequently, undertaking an empirical analysis
based on this formulation of the credit constraint implies either not collecting or discarding
important information. A conceptual framework that explicitly accounts for the credit limit
is presented in the following sections.
THE CONTRACT-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK OF THE CREDIT MARKET
Because the credit limit is the central concept in this paper’s methodology for
quantifying the extent of household access to credit and the effects that access to credit
has on its welfare outcomes, a model of loan transaction focusing explicitly on the concept[bmin , bmax] bmin >0
Rl Rl(b) / (1+r)b
Rl
Rl(b,ù) / (1+r)b + ç(ù) ç: Ù 6 œ
Rl()
(bmax , Rl(.)) bmax
Rl
Rl: [0 , bmax] 6 œ
b 0 [0 , bmax]
b ( 0 [0 , bmax]
(bmax , Rl(.))
b ( 0 [0 , bmax]
Rb 0 #R b < Rl(b ()
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 Due to fixed transaction costs, lenders in the formal and semiformal credit markets have also
2
minimum loan sizes. That is, the amount to be borrowed is restricted to lie in a interval of the form
, with  . Extension to this case is straightforward, and there is no loss of generality in using
0 as a lower bound for loan sizes. 
 We have abstracted from issues regarding collateral in order to simplify the exposition. One
3
specification for  is the linear repayment function  , where r is the interest rate endogenously
chosen by the lender. A more general specification for  that allows state-contingent repayment of loans
is  , where ù is an element of the set of possible states of nature, Ù, and   is
an exogenous, real-valued random variable. State-contingent repayments of loans is also a very important
feature of the informal credit market as documented by Udry (1995).
 This is not the only sufficient condition for breaching the terms of the contract. Even if R  = R(b ),
4                                  b    l *
breach of contract may still have occurred if the timing of the repayment (possibly in partial amounts) does
not correspond with what was specified in the contract. To simplify the notation, we did not include timing
issues in the specification of the repayment function  .
will be presented. The model follows a contract-theoretic view of loan transaction (e.g.,
Freixas and Rochet 1997). Essentially, the lender chooses the credit limit and the amount
he wants to be repaid; the borrower then chooses the amount to be borrowed within this
range and once the loan is disbursed, whether and when to pay back the loan.
More precisely, the lender chooses the pair  where  is the
maximum amount he is willing to lend, and  is a repayment function
 specifying how much, when, and under what conditions he wants to
be repaid for any given loan size  .  The lender then lets the potential
2
borrower choose the optimal amount   to borrow. In other words, the
lender offers the contract  to the borrower who accepts or rejects it by his
choice of  . The contract is accepted if b  is strictly positive, and rejected if
*
b  = 0.  Once the loan is disbursed, the borrower chooses the timing and amount(s) of the
*    3
















 For simplicity, we abstracted from issues related to how   is determined by conditions in the
5
market for on-lending funds (possibility to raise capital from savers or the central bank, determination of
interest paid on savings, regulations from the central bank, etc.). 
of  , the lender is constrained himself by the maximum amount he is able to lend to any
borrower,  .  
5
Some may argue that it is the borrower who first asks for the loan. Then, the lender,
after having received the loan application, decides whether to grant the amount asked or
offer a lesser amount. Furthermore, one can argue that often a loan transaction involves
some bargaining. However, the sequential order in which the loan transaction is started
and whether some bargaining has occurred are details that, in most cases, are not
important for the characterization of the outcome of the loan transaction. What is
important is that, at the end, it is the lender who offers a contract to the borrower who, at
his free will, decides to accept or reject the contract.
Note that the lender’s optimal choice of the credit limit  , which is interpreted
here as the supply for credit, is a function of the maximum he is able to lend,  . It is
also a function of the lender’s subjective assessment of the likelihood of default and of
other borrower’s characteristics. However, this function is not a supply-for-credit function
in the traditional meaning of the term where, under the assumption of price-taking
behavior, the supply-for-credit function represents the schedule of what the lender is
willing to lend as the market interest rate varies. This traditional supply function for credit
is not defined in this context where the lender himself chooses the interest rate. Similarly,






 In the framework of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) the optimal interest rate r ( r ^  in their notation) is the
6                              *
interest rate that maximizes the lender’s expected return from lending to a borrower; taking into account the
possibility of default. It is this expected return which determines   (for a given level of  ). Avery (1981)
also uses the same expected return concept to justify the existence of credit limits for borrowers. His
arguments and econometric specification of the determinants of borrowers’ credit limits were based mostly
on interviews with loan officers in New Jersey.
subjective assessment of the likelihood of default, and of other borrower’s characteristics.
The reader is referred to Avery (1981) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), respectively, for an
empirical and a formal analysis of how the lender’s assessment of the likelihood of default
affects the optimal choice of both   and r.  On the other hand, the function defining the
6
borrower’s optimal choice of loan size b  is a demand-for-credit function in the traditional
*
meaning of the term, i.e., the schedule of what the borrower is willing to borrow when the
interest rate varies. The fact that b  is a function of   in addition to being a function of
*
the interest rate is a mere reflection of the borrowing constraint. However, because of
imperfections in the enforcement of the loan contract and the resulting adverse selection,
the demand for credit need not be a downward-sloping function of the interest rate.
Hence, as pointed out by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), lenders cannot use the interest rate as
a way to ration credit. 
CREDIT CONSTRAINT, CREDIT RATIONING, AND ACCESS TO CREDIT
The arguments in the previous sections have postulated that any borrower is
constrained to some extent in his demand for credit from any source. In other words, at
any point in time any potential borrower faces a constraint in the form:0 # b # bmax .
15
(1)
The question is not whether this constraint exists, but rather how it is formulated.
One advantage of the formulation of the borrowing constraint in equation (1) compared to
the standard formulation in the LC/PIH literature is the fact that the variables directly
related to the credit market are explicit in equation (1). Also, with this formulation there
can be a separate credit constraint for each source of credit (e.g., formal and informal
credits). 
The term credit rationing is often used interchangeably with credit constraint. But
they express two different concepts. Credit rationing occurs because there is a wedge
between what a lender is willing and able to lend and, from the analysis of Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981), this wedge results from the exclusive choice of the lender. In other words, it
is the lender’s decision to further restrict the supply of credit below the amount he is
actually able to lend that causes credit rationing. On the other hand, whether or not a
borrower ends up being effectively credit constrained depends on his optimal loan
demand. Even if, given the constraint set by the lender, the borrower ends up optimally
borrowing an amount strictly less than what the lender is willing to lend, the credit
transaction is still characterized by credit rationing. Furthermore, even though in this
particular case the credit constraint ends up not being binding in the sense that the optimal16
  Or he may decide to borrow just $3,000 to buy a used car. 
7
amount borrowed is strictly less than the maximum amount that could be borrowed, the
borrower may or may not be characterized as being credit constrained.
To illustrate this point, take the example of a borrower who wants to borrow for the
sole purpose of buying an indivisible durable good. To be more precise, assume that he
wants to finance a new car at $15,000. Also assume that the potential lender is rich
enough to be able to lend up to $20,000, but after assessing the borrower’s likelihood of
repaying the loan, he decides that, for whatever purpose, the maximum he is willing to
gamble on this particular borrower is $8,000. Under these circumstances, the borrower
may decide optimally not to borrow at all because any amount borrowed will not be
enough to cover the cost of the car.  In this case, although the borrower ends up
7
borrowing an amount strictly less than what the lender is willing to lend him, there has
been credit rationing in the amount of $12,000. Clearly, the borrower is also credit
constrained in the sense that he could not borrow as much as he wanted. Yet, his credit
constraint is not binding because the optimal amount actually borrowed is strictly less than
the $8,000 credit limit. The borrower would not have been credit constrained if the car he
wanted to buy costed only $5,000. But, in this latter case there still would have been
credit rationing in the same amount of $12,000 (it just did not matter for the borrower). In
other words, a borrower may be credit rationed without being credit constrained. On the
other hand, if the maximum the lender is able to lend were in reality $8,000 instead ofbmax
bmax
17
$20,000, then there would be no credit rationing, yet the borrower would be credit
constrained if he wanted to finance a new car at $10,000.
The example illustrates the difference between being credit constrained and being
credit rationed. It also illustrates the ambiguity in the current meaning and use of the
concept of credit constraint. For many, being credit constrained means having a binding
credit constraint, i.e., when the optimal amount borrowed b  is exactly equal to the credit
*
limit  (in other words, when the borrower has exhausted his credit line). But, as we
have seen in the example above, this definition does not correspond to the meaning of the
concept of not being able to borrow as much as one wants. It can be seen that the
definition will capture the meaning of the concept only when the loan is sought for the
purpose of acquiring a divisible good; with the additional assumption of monotonic
preference (or local nonsatiation). The formal definition of being credit constrained that
captures or translates the meaning of not being able to borrow as much as one wants is
that the optimal amount borrowed when borrowing under the credit constraint (1) is
strictly less than the optimal amount that would be borrowed if the credit constraint (1)
did not exist. This definition covers both cases of divisible and indivisible goods.
Although a binding credit constraint is not a necessary condition for being credit
constrained, it is still important to know whether or not the credit constraint (1) is
binding at the time credit was sought; and if so, how severe is the binding of the
constraint, i.e., how close to zero is  . The lack of access to credit from a given source




constraint, occurring when the credit limit   for that source of credit is zero. By
definition then, one has access to a certain type of credit when its credit limit   for that
type is strictly positive; and one improves one’s access to that type of credit by increasing
 for that type of credit.
It is important to note that with this definition of access to credit, someone may
lack access to credit without being credit constrained. For example, in the empirical
evidence presented below, there were respondents who said they could not obtain any loan
from a formal lender, but gave the reason of not needing any loan or disliking any
borrowing when answering the question, “Why did not you ask for any loan from a formal
lender?” Hence, by definition, these households lack access to formal credit (since b  = max
0), but they are not credit constrained in the formal sector since the optimal amounts they
would have borrowed from a formal lender were the same (zero) with or without the
credit constraint (1). This is also another illustration of the difference between being credit
constrained and having a binding credit constraint (b  = b  in this case). 
*
max
ACCESS TO CREDIT AND PARTICIPATION IN FORMAL CREDIT PROGRAMS
Access to formal credit is often confused with participation in formal credit
programs. Indeed, the two concepts are often used interchangeably in many credit studies.
The crucial difference between the two concepts lies in the fact that participation in a




 This is not always the case in some credit programs. For example, both the Grameen Bank in
8
Bangladesh and the PMERW credit program in Malawi have a rule stipulating that at any point in time only
half of the members of a group or club can obtain credit. The other half of the group will received credit only
when members of the first half have fully paid back their loans.
program is a limiting constraint put upon them (e.g., availability and eligibility criteria of
credit programs). In other words, consistent with the arguments and definitions in the
previous sections, participation is more of a demand-side issue related to the potential
borrower’s choice of the optimal loan size b , while access is more of a supply-side issue
*
related to the potential lender’s choice of the credit limit  .
The difference between the two concepts may become clearer by remembering from
the arguments above that in any area with a formal credit program, the group of
nonparticipants can be divided into two subgroups, the first consisting of the
nonparticipants who were constrained through eligibility criteria (i.e., they have  ),
and the other by those who chose not to participate because their optimal demands for
formal credit were zero, i.e., they have b  = 0. If it is assumed that credit program
*
participants are always able to borrow, i.e.,   for participants,  then it is clear that
8
the second subgroup of eligible nonparticipant do have access to formal credit. Some may
be uncomfortable to see some nonparticipants classified as having access to formal credit.
However, this is consistent with the fact that program participation is not a separate
spontaneous decision, but is rather part of the demand for formal credit that, under
uncertainty, is a contingent plan (a sequence of acts contingent on the occurrence of






decision to participate in a credit program is just a contingent act within that contingent
plan (which includes other contingent acts such as how much to ask to borrow, when to
ask it, etc.); and it is implemented only if the demand for credit is not unconditionally zero,
i.e., if b (ù) > 0 for some  , and the events upon which that decision was
*
conditioned do occur. Hence, if a nonparticipant does not anticipate wanting formal credit,
i.e., if b (ù) = 0 for all  , there is no need for him to consider joining a formal credit
*
program, even if, with a  , he could possibly borrow from that program, i.e., by
definition he has access to formal credit.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF THE IMPACTS OF ACCESS TO
CREDIT
One of the most important policy and research questions regarding credit markets is
often phrased in terms of how access or improved access to credit translates into change in
household’s outcomes such as agricultural output, income, food security, etc. This
question is central in many decisions regarding government and NGO-supported credit
programs where the economic benefits of providing households access to credit are
compared to the economic costs of setting up these programs and delivering the credits to
the target households. In the previous sections, access to credit and improvement in
access to credit were identified, respectively, with a strictly positive and increasing credit
limit,  . Hence, in the framework of this paper the above important policy and research




in   from any strictly positive value translates into change in the household’s behavioral
and welfare outcomes of interest. The methodological implications of using the credit limit
variable to measure the effect of access to formal credit on household welfare outcomes
are discussed in detail in Diagne (1997b), which applies the methodology to data from
Malawi.
“EXPECTATIONS” AND OBSERVABILITY OF THE CREDIT LIMIT
To this point in the analysis, the roles of borrowers and lenders have been kept
distinct. However, in the informal credit market of developing countries, it is not always
possible to classify a household as either a lender or a borrower, because many households
are borrowing and lending at the same time. This is explained by the insurance function
played by the informal credit market (Fafchamps 1992; Coate and Ravallion 1993; Lund
and Fafchamps 1997). Hence, under these circumstances the household demand for credit
cannot be modeled separately from its supply, as one of the motivations for giving out
loans and gifts to other households is to preserve or improve access to credit in case the
need for borrowing arises. In other words, when a household acting as a potential lender is
faced with a demand for credit, its choice of a credit limit   for the borrowing
household is naturally influenced by its desire or not to maintain or increase a strictly
positive  , which will be chosen by the borrowing household when there is a need to





These observations suggest that the credit limit a borrower faces depends on both
the lender and borrower’s characteristics and actions. But it also depends on random
events that affect the fortune of lenders and other potential borrowers (who may compete
with the borrower for the same possible credit). For example, one can expect the
occurrence of drought in a rural agriculture-based economy to reduce the supply of
informal credit, while increasing the number of people looking for loans. Hence, the credit
limit   facing a potential borrower is a random variable whose value is determined by
events, some of which are under the borrower’s control, others under the lender’s control,
and still others outside the control of either both. Therefore, the borrowing constraint (1)
is stochastic, and depends on the prevailing state of nature. This implies that whether and
where the credit constraint will bind cannot be known in advance for sure. Thus, forward-
looking households may anticipate possible binding of their credit constraints and take
precautionary measures (e.g., saving and income diversification) to ensure that their
consumption and/or production plans will not suffer much when this occurs (Deaton
1991).
That   depends on random events also implies that its realized value at the times
when borrowing actually takes place cannot be known exactly in advance (i.e., with
probability 1) by either the lender or the borrower. The fact that   cannot be known in
advance by the borrower is clear, since it ultimately is the result of the lender’s choice
(although, as explained above, the borrower can influence that choice to some extent).













actual borrowing. However, formal lenders usually provide enough information about
their loan policies (eligibility criteria, types of projects funded, collateral and down
payment requirements, etc.) to enable potential borrowers to have reasonably accurate
expectations about their   from each source of formal credit. In the cases of NGO- and
government-supported credit programs, they even usually set and announce fixed credit
limits for all potential borrowers.
In general, the potential lender also cannot know in advance of the time of actual
borrowing the exact value of  , because his choice will depend on  , the maximum
he would be able to lend at that time, which in turn depends on random events outside of
his control. The lender can only form expectations about those random events and about
. But, again for formal lenders,   is usually very small for any single borrower
compared to  , so that even unexpected (relatively small) changes in the latter would
not have any influence in the choice of the former. However, for government- and NGO-
supported credit programs, uncertainty about institutional arrangements, program
objectives, target clientele, and external funds from donors can have significant influence
on  .
Furthermore, at the time of borrowing, it is only the lender who observes the
realized value of   (which he himself determines), and may or may not have the
opportunity to reveal it to the borrower. For example, the outcome of the loan transaction
might be characterized by 0 < b (ù) / b(r,b ,ù) < b (ù).  That is, if the borrower’s
*
max     max








 The borrower’s optimal loan size b  depends on other environmental and borrower variables.
9            *
However, in the expression above we have abstracted from these variables to simplify the notation. Also, to
simplify the notation, we use the same notation ù for both the true (but unknown) state of nature and for a
generic element of Ù, the set of all possible states of nature. There should be no confusion because the
meaning should be obvious from the context.
realized value of  , then the lender may never have the chance to tell the borrower his
actual realized choice of  .  Clearly, if at a particular time a borrower does not ask for
9
a loan from a given source of credit, he will never learn, even in retrospect, about his
realized   from that source of credit at that time (there may be exceptions in the cases
of NGO and government-supported credit programs that set and announce fixed credit
limits for all potential borrowers). However, the potential borrower will always have
expectations on what would have been the likely value of   at that time. Furthermore,
it is precisely the borrower’s expectations about the likely value of  and its variability
that influence his behavior and make him decide in particular whether to seek a loan from
that particular source of credit. For example, in the direct method of detecting credit
constraint discussed in Section 2, the classification of borrowers usually includes a class of
“discouraged borrowers” (e.g., Jappelli 1990). These borrowers did not seek any loan
because either they expected to face zero or very low  , or they expected a relative
high cost (including transaction costs) to obtain loans. The discouraged borrowers may
have been wrong in their expectations and could perhaps have obtained worthwhile loans
at reasonable costs. But, whether they are wrong or not, in the end it was the expectations
about their  that determined their behavior, not the realized values of their  , which













credit, the realized value of the optimal loan size is largely determined by his expectations
about his   (especially if the borrower has reasonably accurate information that allows
him to accurately predict the location of  ).
Because of the above intuitively justified reasons, it is very important that the
realized optimal choice b (ù) / b(r,b ,ù) be a function of the random variable  , not
*
max
of its possible realized value  . This allows the borrower’s realized optimal loan
size to be determined not only by the realized value   at time of borrowing, but also
by his expectations about the likely value of   and its variability, made well in advance
of the time of borrowing. Otherwise, allowing b  to depend solely on the possible realized
*
value   corresponds to a myopic behavior in the part of the borrower, i.e., the
borrower would be making his borrowing choices not using his subjective assessment of
the relative likelihood of the random events or any relevant information pertaining to those
events that determine the realized value of  .
Note also that the fact that the borrower’s optimal loan size depends primarily on
his expectations about  does not mean that in the formulation of the credit constraint
(1),   should be replaced by the borrower’s expected value for  . The credit
constraint (1) is a stochastic constraint that must be satisfied for every possible state of
nature ù, regardless of whether the borrower correctly predicts the location of  . The
way b  depends on the borrower’s expectations about   is endogenous to the choice
*
problem and is governed by the shape of his utility function (assuming that the objective









  However, Lund (1995) managed to interview both borrowers and lenders in her survey in the
10
Phillippines.
form of the dependence of b  on   has been justified intuitively here, it can be derived
*
rigorously. In general, if the utility function is not too restrictive, under standard
assumptions on expectations formation b  depends not only on the expected value and
*
higher moments of  , but also on   separately as a random variable (see Diagne
[1994] for examples of univariate and multivariate demand functions derived under
uncertainty). 
The arguments in the previous paragraphs imply that in the analysis of the demand
for credit, the borrower’s expectations about   are much more important in
determining the demanded amounts of credit than the realized values of  . However,
from a policy viewpoint, what is of most interest is not the borrower’s response to change
in his expectations about  , but his response to change in   itself, since it is the
variable under the lender’s control and that determines access to credit. In the empirical
evidence presented in the next section, it is the borrower’s expected   from different
sources of credit that were collected. The survey did not collect data on   or the
realized values of  , which only lenders could provide with reasonable accuracy. The
survey focused on the demand side of the credit market, and for a relatively large survey it
was not feasible to interview the lender for each loan transaction. Moreover, borrowers
may not be willing to identify their informal lenders or may refuse to be interviewed if they















the only information collected is expected  , how one can estimate and evaluate the
impact of   itself (or its realized value) on b  (or on any other household choice or
*
outcome variables). For a purely descriptive analysis aimed at comparing households with
regard to the extent of their access to credit (i.e., comparing their  ) and binding credit
constraint (i.e., comparing their   with respect to their b ), the inference that can be
*
done based solely on expected   and the realized value of b  is very limited.
*
Furthermore, the classification of households based solely on a descriptive analysis using
expected  can only reflect the households’ perceptions of their situation on the credit
market as in the direct method of detecting credit constraint households (Jappelli 1990;
Feder et al. 1990).
However, with an econometric analysis it is possible to estimate and evaluate the
impact of   on b  and other household choice or outcome variables based solely on
*
expected  . For this to be possible, it is necessary to assume that the realized b  and
*
other household choice or outcome variables depend only on expected   and not on
higher moments of   and its realized values. This restriction is plausible if   does
not vary much (so that its variance and higher centered moments are close to zero) and the
borrower has reliable information that allows him to predict the location of   with
reasonable accuracy (so that the realized value of   will have little influence on realized
optimal choices). Under this restriction, the assessment of the impacts of   on
household choice and outcomes variables can be done by exploiting the proprieties of the28
  Even Avery (1981) whose study focused on the credit limit did not have data on it. His econometric
11
model was based on a disequilibrium model, where the observed consumer’s debt is the minimum of the credit
limit (supply of credit) and the demand for credit.
mathematical expectation operator, which, as usual, is identified with the borrower’s
expectation process (see Appendix for details). 
4. EXTENT OF HOUSEHOLD ACCESS TO FORMAL AND INFORMAL
CREDIT IN MALAWI AND BANGLADESH
This section presents evidence on the extent of household access to credit in Malawi
and Bangladesh. Following the methodology presented in the previous section, the credit
limit variable is used to assess the extent of households’ access to formal and informal
credit, as well as the binding of their credit constraints. As noted in the previous section,
there is nothing new in the concept of credit limits. However, to the authors’ knowledge,
IFPRI’s household surveys in Bangladesh (1994) and Malawi (1995) were the first to
collect data on the credit limit variable.  For this reason, details will be given on the way
11
the credit limit data was collected in the Malawi survey to let the reader be aware of some
of the problems encountered in the process.
The Malawi survey was a year-long, three-round survey (February–December 1995)
that collected detailed information on various activities undertaken by 404 households in
45 villages in five districts of Malawi. A stratified, random-sampling procedure was used
to select the households surveyed. About half of the sample were participants of four29
 The five credit programs were Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC), Promotion of Micro-
12
Enterprises for Rural Women (PMERW), the Malawi Mudzi Fund (MMF), and the Malawi Union of Savings
and Credit Cooperatives (MUSCCO). The first three programs are based on group lending while MUSCCO
is a union of individual, membership-based local saving and credit unions.
credit programs.  The second half of the sample was equally divided between past
12
participants (mostly from a failed government credit program), and households that had
never participated in any formal credit program. The reader is referred to Diagne, Zeller,
and Mataya (1996) for details on the survey and data collection methodology.
The credit and saving module of the questionnaire was administered to all adult
household members over 17 years old. For the question related to the credit limit, they
were asked the maximum amount they could borrow during the recall period from both
informal and formal sources of credit. If the respondent was involved in a loan transaction
as a borrower, the question was asked for each loan transaction (both for granted and
rejected loan demands). In this case, the credit limit refers to the time of borrowing and to
the lender involved in that particular loan transaction. If the respondent did not ask for a
loan, the question was asked separately for formal and informal sources of credit with no
reference to particular formal or informal lenders. Respondents who were granted loans
were also asked the same general question (i.e., with no reference to particular formal or
informal lenders) in a way that elicited the credit limit they would face if they had wanted
more loans, not just from the same lender, but from the same sector of the credit market
(formal or informal) where they had borrowed. Consequently, for both formal and
informal credit, the maximum formal and informal credit limits of each adult household30
member were obtained in each round, even if the member was not involved in any loan
transaction. The question on the credit limit in the Bangladesh survey was more or less
similar, except it was asked only to those involved in a loan transaction (see Zeller,
Ahmed, and Sharma 1996).
Given the central importance of the credit limit variable for the methodology of the
study, several control questions were used to verify the consistency of the answers given
by respondents. Such control questions included their program membership status;
whether, if they did receive a loan of the same type, they were given a lesser amount than
asked for, and if yes, how much had they asked; whether they asked for a loan and were
rejected; and why they did not ask for any (or more) loans. In addition, the enumerators
were instructed to use other control questions not included in the questionnaires whenever
there appeared to be inconsistencies in the respondents’ answers.
A good deal of time was spent checking the consistency of answers to these
questions and in relation to other parts of the questionnaire. As a result of these checks,
during the first round of the survey most respondents were visited at least twice to verify
their answers or clarify apparent inconsistencies in their answers. Most inconsistencies
occurred in the first days of the survey, and resulted from some misunderstanding of the
question, which was often interpreted by either the enumerator or the respondent as
asking the maximum you would like to borrow. The misunderstanding was resolved by
instructing the enumerators to explain to respondents, before they answered the question,
the difference between the two questions.31
 To correct for the oversampling of credit program participants, the summary statistics in the tables
13
have been weighted using the strata population weights from the village and national population censuses.
 In Malawi, the duration of the recall period for which the access to credit was explored was October
14
1993 to March 1995. For Bangladesh, the recall period was July 1993 to August 1995. 
Finally, as explained in the previous section, what is referred here as the credit limit
is actually the respondents’ perceived or expected credit limit. However, with this
clarification, for the sake of brevity, the reference to the term expected will be dropped in
the following discussion of the empirical evidence. 
EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTION OF CREDIT LIMITS AND UNUSED CREDIT LINES
Table 1 presents the average informal and formal credit limits with the
corresponding average amounts of unused credit lines, i.e., the average of the differences
between the respective credit limits and amounts borrowed, in Bangladesh and Malawi.
13
In the population as whole, the average informal and formal credit limits are, respectively,
$40 and $71 in Bangladesh and $7 and $11 in Malawi.  To put these figures in
14
perspective, the 1995 per capita GNP were $240 and $170, respectively (World Tables
1997). These average figures are not good indicators of the levels of access to credit,
however, because of the truncated nature of the credit limit distributions. The box plot
diagrams of the distributions presented in Figure 1 give a better picture of the extent of
access to credit in both countries. The figure shows that in Bangladesh the median formal
and informal credit limits are, respectively, $50 and $13, and 50 percent of the population
can borrow at most $100 from the formal sector and $50 from the informal sector. The32
ability to borrow is significantly more restricted in Malawi where the median formal and
informal credit limits are, respectively, zero and $3. Moreover, 50 percent of the
Malawian population can borrow at most less than $10 from either sector of the credit
market.
In both countries those who are presently borrowing from the formal sector had
higher median formal credit limits ($75 in Bangladesh and $25 in Malawi). But their
median informal credit limit is higher only in Bangladesh ($25 in Bangladesh and zero in
Malawi). For Malawi, this is likely to be a reflection of the fact that two of the credit
programs studied are targeted to poor women who might have been excluded from the
few existing sources of informal credit because of their socioeconomic situation (see
Figure 3). For Bangladesh, the positive correlation suggests that informal lenders are
willing to lend significantly more to those who are participating in the formal credit market
than to the rest of the population. One explanation is that perhaps formal sector borrowers
are perceived as good credit risks because they are able to negotiate and manage much
bigger loans from formal sources. Furthermore, informal lenders may believe that, if
necessary, they may divert formal loans to repay their informal ones. However, the
distributions of the unused credit lines shown in Figure 2 reveal interesting facts on the
behavior toward informal sources of credit of formal sector borrowers in Bangladesh.
Indeed, although they have higher informal credit limits compared to the rest of the
population, they use less of them. In fact, almost half of them have over $50 of unused
informal credit lines and virtually all of them deplete their formal credit lines. This perhaps33
indicates that higher informal credit limits are coming from professional moneylenders and
are too expensive as source of loans compared to formal sources. Another explanation is
that despite having higher informal credit limits compared to the rest of the population,
formal sector borrowers prefer the formal sector because the types of investment for
which formal loans are sought are too big to be financed through informal sources. As
Figure 2 shows, in both countries the median unused formal credit lines are zero for the
population as a whole and for formal sector borrowers. 
Finally, with respect to gender differences in access to credit, Figure 3 shows that,
both in Bangladesh and Malawi in the general population, women have higher median
formal credit limits but lower median informal credit limits compared to men. However,
when the comparison is restricted to formal sector borrowers only, men have higher
median credit limits in both sectors of the credit markets. Moreover, Figure 4 shows that
in both countries female formal sector borrowers are more likely to have a binding credit
constraint in both sectors than their male counterparts. This provides a justification for
targeting credit to women since they are more likely to have a binding credit constrained
than men and have good reputations in repaying back their loans.
ACCESS TO CREDIT, CREDIT CONSTRAINTS, AND PARTICIPATION IN
CREDIT PROGRAMS
To get a picture of how participation in a credit program is related to access to
credit at the household level, participating and nonparticipating households have been34
classified according to the types of access to credit and binding of the credit constraints of
their individual members. A household is said to have access to a type of credit if at least
one of its members has a strictly positive credit limit for that type of credit. Similarly, a
household is classified as credit constrained for a type of credit if at least one of its
members is constrained for that type of credit. Tables 2 and 3 present the outcome of this
classification according to membership status in a credit program. First, consistent with
the conceptual distinction between access to credit and participation in a credit program,
Table 2 shows that 16 percent and 8 percent of households that never participated in any
formal credit program in Bangladesh and Malawi, respectively, did have access to formal
credit during the recall period, i.e., they could obtain a formal loan if they had wanted.
However, more than two-thirds of the households in Bangladesh do not have access to
any type of credit. The corresponding figure for Malawi is 28 percent.
Second, further illustrating the importance of the distinction between access to
credit and participation in a credit program, Table 2 shows that up to 31 percent and 40
percent of households currently participating in formal credit programs in Bangladesh and
Malawi, respectively, did not have access to formal credit during the recall period. This
means that not only did they not receive any formal loan during that period, but also they
could not borrow anything from their own program. Hence, even for participants of credit
programs, their continuous access to formal credit cannot be taken for granted and should
be considered (together with access to informal credit) as subject to random events.
Moreover, from the participating household’s perspective, these fluctuations in its access35
to formal credit brings some type of uncertainty in its planning and decisionmaking
process that can be more difficult to cope with than the uncertainty faced when not
participating in a credit program. Indeed, unpredictable institutional changes or abrupt
changes in the policy of a credit program can create more damages in the operations of a
profitable business than nature-induced events that, while still uncertain, are often
predictable.
Finally, Table 3 gives information on whether households’ credit constraints were
binding or not. It shows a clear positive impact that participation in credit programs can
have in relaxing households’ credit constraints. Of current members of credit programs, 65
percent and 39 percent, respectively, did not experience any binding informal or formal
credit constraint in Bangladesh and Malawi. In contrast, among those households that had
never been members of any credit program, only 16 percent and 8 percent, respectively,
did not experience any binding credit constraints. Taking Bangladesh as an example, of
those households that had never been members, 69 percent experienced at least once a
credit constraint in the informal and the formal credit market during the recall period of
almost two years. Fifteen percent had binding credit constraints in the formal sector only,
but not in the informal sector. These results point out to the changes in credit access and
occurrence of credit constraints that can be brought about by expanding microfinance
institutions that lend to the rural poor. 
5. CONCLUSION36
The quantification of the impact of improved access to formal credit on different
groups of households is important for policy purposes, not only because it can serve as a
guide for the allocation of scarce resources to different and numerous development
programs competing for the same funds, but also because it allows one to determine the
relative importance of the various factors that make some households in some
socioeconomic environments benefit more from access to formal credit than others. This
paper has presented a conceptual framework and data collection methodology for
measuring the extent of household access to credit and analyzing the socioeconomic
determinants and impacts of the extent of access to credit.
The paper reviewed first the two main methodologies that have been used up to
now to measure household access to credit and credit constraints and exposed their
shortcomings. The first method tries to detect credit constrained households through tests
of violation of the life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis. Empirical evidence from this
methodology regarding presence or absence of credit constraint has been inconclusive,
mostly because violation of the implications of life cycle/permanent income hypothesis is
neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for being credit constrained. The second
method of measuring access and detecting credit constraint collects household-level credit
market information directly from household surveys to determine whether households are
credit constrained. This classification is then used in reduced-form regression equations to
analyze the determinants of the likelihood of a household being credit constrained and the37
effects of this likelihood on various household outcomes. Despite representing a
substantial improvement in comparison to the first method, it is still incapable of providing
the framework that allows one to quantify the extent to which households are credit
constrained or to satisfactorily assess the impact of access to credit on household welfare
outcomes. 
The methodology presented in this paper corrects the shortcomings of the direct
method by developing a conceptual framework and data collection methodology that
focus on the concept of credit limit. This focus is justified by the fact that every potential
borrower faces a credit limit because of asymmetries of information between borrowers
and lenders and the imperfect enforcement of loan contracts. Therefore, a household’s
credit limit from any given source of credit is the best measure of its degree of access to
that source of credit.
Furthermore, the changes in household behavioral and welfare outcomes in response
to changes in its credit limit represent the effects of access to credit (or improvement in
access) on those household outcomes. Hence, once data are collected on households’
credit limits, econometric analysis allows one to quantify the determinants of the extent of
households’ access to credit as well as the effects such access has on household welfare
outcomes. This data has been collected for the first time in IFPRI surveys conducted in
Bangladesh and Malawi. The descriptive summary statistics from the two surveys
presented in this paper illustrate the usefulness of using the credit limit to assess the extent
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derivative  In fact, in general   is a continuous linear function and not a real number, and th
int
show here, these technical issues need not be discussed.
APPENDIX
 WHEN ONLY   IS OBSERVED
 can be estimated
when 
value is. First, we recall that the usual partial effect estimated in standard regression
analysis is the quantity 
of the dependent variable following small changes in the possible values of the random
variable  , which
involves taking a partial derivative with respect to a random variable (a function!). Hence,
Even the interpretation of “marginal change” is not trivial in this context.  However,
because of the underlying metrics, for all practical purposes the two quantities can be
interpreted in the same ways without worrying about all the subtleties involved.
 and
other household choice variables depend only on   and not on higher
moments of 
with the mathematical expectation operator E
generality, we assume a linear dependence and abstract from the other independentf(bmax,.) = âEbmax
Mf(bmax,.)/Mbmax= âE
Mf(bmax,.)/Mbmax(h) = âEh bmax dbmax
Mf(bmax,.)/Mbmax(dbmax) = âEdbmax Mf(bmax,.)/Mbmax
b * bmax
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variables, i.e.,  . Thus, â is the usual partial effect and the coefficient to
be estimated in a standard regression. Because the expectation operator is a linear
function, one has  , and for all random variables h,
. In particular, for a “marginal change” in   of size  , we
have  . In fact,   can be identified with â
and interpreted as the expected change in   following an expected change in  . This
proves the claim made in the paper.41
TABLES4
3
Table 1—Average maximum credit limit and unused credit line in the informal and formal market, by country and by
gender of respondent
Credit limit (in US dollar) Male Female All Male  Female All Male Female All Male Female All
Bangladesh Malawi
All respondents Formal sector borrowers only All respondents Formal sector borrowers only
Informal credit limit 53 11 40 130 22 69 7 6 7 9 5 6
of which unused 29  7 22 130 22 69 3 3 3 7 3 5
Formal credit limit 71 71 71 159 90 117 10 12 11 60 38 45
of which unused 58 43 52 52 13 28 4 3 3 16 7 10
Source:  Bangladesh: IFPRI, Rural Finance and Food Security Survey; Malawi: IFPRI/Bunda, Rural Finance survey.
Note:  1995 per capita GNP for Bangladesh and Malawi are, respectively, $240 and $170 (World Tables 1997).44
Table 2—Percentage of households having access to informal and formal credit: by
membership in group-based credit program and by country
Access to credit during recall period s s s s s s
 a
Bangladesh Malawi
Current Past been Current Past been
member member member member member member
Never Never
No access 24% 64% 69% 10% 17% 28%
Informal only  7%  9% 15% 30% 50% 64%
Formal only  3%  4%  0% 16% 0%  0%
Informal and formal 66% 23% 16% 44% 32%  8%
Source: Bangladesh: IFPRI, Rural Finance and Food Security Survey, 1994; Malawi: IFPRI/Bunda, Rural Finance
survey, 1995.
In Malawi, the duration of the recall period for which the access to credit was explored was October 1993 to March
a
1995. For Bangladesh, the recall period was July 1993 to August 1995. 
Table 3—Percentage of households experiencing a binding credit constraint in the
informal and formal market, by membership in group-based credit
program and by country
Credit constraint during recall period s s s s s s
a
Bangladesh  Malawi
Current Past been Current Past been
member member member member member member
Never Never
Informal and formal 24% 64% 69% 15% 21% 33%
Informal only  3%  4%  0% 12%  0%  0%
Formal only  8%  9% 15% 34% 50% 60%
No binding constraint 65% 23% 16% 39% 29%  8%
Source: Bangladesh: IFPRI, Rural Finance and Food Security Survey, 1994; Malawi: IFPRI/Bunda, Rural Finance
survey, 1995.
In Malawi, the duration of the recall period for which the access to credit was explored was October 1993 to March
a
1995. For Bangladesh, the recall period was July 1993 to August 1995. 45













































Figure 1—Distribution of formal and informal credit limits in Bangladesh and
Malawi: Box plot diagrams
All respondents
Formal sector borrowers only**
Credit limits (US$).
All respondents Formal Informal  Formal Informal
Bangladesh Malawi
Mean   71 40 11 7
Median  50 13 0 3
Standard deviation 118 143 33 24
Minimum 0 0 0 0
Maximum 1250 2500 667 800
Source: Bangladesh: IFPRI, Rural Finance and Food Security Survey, 1994; Malawi: IFPRI/Bunda, Rural Finance survey, 1995.
Notes: * Box plot diagrams are interpreted as follow: For each box, 50 percent of cases have values within the box and the solid
horizontal line inside is the median. The length of the box is the interquartile range and the lower boundary (resp upper boundary)
of the box is the 25th (resp 75th) percentile. Finally, the circles are outliers and the stars are extreme values.
** For Bangladesh, the informal credit limit figures do not include the ones for formal sector borrowers who had no informal loan
transaction. 48













































Figure 2—Distribution of unused formal and informal credit lines in Bangladesh
and Malawi: Box plot diagrams
All respondents
Formal sector borrowers only**
Unused credit lines (US$).
 All respondents Formal Informal  Formal Informal
Bangladesh Malawi
Mean   52 22 3 3
Median  0 5 0 1
Standard deviation 111 130 16 9
Minimum 0 0 0 0
Maximum 1,163 2,500 438 267
Source: Bangladesh: IFPRI, Rural Finance and Food Security Survey, 1994; Malawi: IFPRI/Bunda, Rural Finance survey, 1995.
Notes: * Box plot diagrams are interpreted as follow: For each box, 50 percent of cases have values within the box and the solid
horizontal line inside is the median. The length of the box is the interquartile range and the lower boundary (resp upper boundary)
of the box is the 25th (resp 75th) percentile. Finally, the circles are outliers and the stars are extreme values.
** For Bangladesh, the informal credit limit figures do not include the ones for formal sector borrowers who had no informal loan
transaction.





















































Figure 3—Distribution of formal and informal credit limits in Bangladesh and
Malawi: Box plot diagrams by gender of respondents
All respondents
Formal sector borrowers only**
Bangladesh Malawi
Credit limits (US$) Formal Informal  Formal Informal
All respondents Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Mean   71 71 53 11 10 12 7 6
Median  0 75 13 5 0 0 3 2
Standard deviation 139 59 174 22 36 29 15 31
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 1,250 300 2,500 150 667 333 500 800
Source: Bangladesh: IFPRI, Rural Finance and Food Security Survey, 1994; Malawi: IFPRI/Bunda, Rural Finance survey, 1995.
Notes: * Box plot diagrams are interpreted as follow: For each box, 50 percent of cases have values within the box and the solid
horizontal line inside is the median. The length of the box is the interquartile range and the lower boundary (resp upper boundary)
of the box is the 25th (resp 75th) percentile. Finally, the circles are outliers and the stars are extreme values.
** For Bangladesh, the informal credit limit figures do not include the ones for formal sector borrowers who had no informal loan
transaction.
















































Figure 4—Distribution of unused formal and informal credit lines in Bangladesh
and Malawi: Box plot diagrams by gender of respondents
All respondents
Formal sector borrowers only**
Bangladesh Malawi
Unused credit lines (US$). Formal Informal  Formal Informal
All respondents Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Femal
Mean   58 43 29 7 4 3 3 3
Median  0 25 6 4 0 0 1 0
Standard deviation 130 60 159 21 17 16 6 12
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 1,163 250 2,500 125 438 300 67 267
Source: Bangladesh: IFPRI, Rural Finance and Food Security Survey, 1994; Malawi: IFPRI/Bunda, Rural Finance survey, 1995.
Notes: * Box plot diagrams are interpreted as follow: For each box, 50 percent of cases have values within the box
and the solid horizontal line inside is the median. The length of the box is the interquartile range and the
lower boundary (resp upper boundary) of the box is the 25th (resp 75th) percentile. Finally, the circles are
outliers and the stars are extreme values.
** For Bangladesh, the informal credit limit figures do not include the ones for formal sector borrowers who
had no informal loan transaction.53
Per capita 1995 GNP for Bangladesh and Malawi are, respectively, $240 and $170 (World Tables 1997).54
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